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An interesting phenomenon called “hidden opportunity cost of time effect” was detected
in intertemporal choices. The majority of our participants preferred the smaller but
sooner (SS) option to the larger but later (LL) option if opportunity cost was explicit.
However, a higher proportion of participants preferred the LL to SS option if opportunity
cost was hidden. This shift violates the invariance principle and opens a new way to
encourage future-oriented behavior. By simply mentioning the “obvious” opportunity cost
of alternatives, decision makers can be more informed in prioritizing their long-term goals
rather than short-term goals.
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Introduction
Common examples of intertemporal choices in daily life are choosing between spending money on
a vacation, investing in a superannuation fund for your retirement, and working on a promised
paper now or later. In these cases, people have options that involve tradeoffs between costs and
benefits occurring at different times. There is a general consensus in the literature on intertem-
poral choice that future outcomes are discounted (or undervalued) relative to immediate outcomes
(Soman et al., 2005). Theoretical development in intertemporal choice has progressed steadily along
a similar route as risky choice (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992). Both lines of research have spawned
a large amount of variant models, assuming a maximization principle; specifically, people calculate
the mathematical expectation of each outcome and add them together before choosing the option
that maximizes overall value or utility (Sun and Li, 2010; Rao and Li, 2011)
Opportunity cost is “the evaluation placed on the most highly valued of the rejected alterna-
tives or opportunities” (Eatwell et al., 1998; Buchanan, 2008) or “the loss of other alternatives
when one alternative is chosen” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2010) or “the value of the next-
highest-valued alternative use of some resource (e.g., you spend time going to a movie, you
cannot spend that time at home reading a book)” (Henderson, 2014). Fundamental to the dis-
cipline of economics is the issue of choice: choosing between scarce resources or alternatives
(Meyer and Land, 2003). People, however, seem to ignore opportunity cost in the intertemporal
choice involving money as the outcome (i.e., they ignore the fact that they could choose options
detrimental to others). For example, Read et al. (2012) observed how the difference between a
smaller but sooner (SS) option and a larger but later (LL) option is framed either as a total inter-
est earned, as an interest rate, or as a total amount earned. They also examined whether the
LL option is described as a consequence of the investment for SS option. These variations sig-
nificantly modified the preferences of decision makers because they attracted the attention of
decision makers to the opportunity cost. Previous researchers have found a hidden-zero effect
in intertemporal choice, suggesting that explicitly referring to the hidden zero in each alternative
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(e.g., “Would you prefer [A] $5 today and $0 in 26 days OR
[B] $0 today and $6.20 in 26 days?”) decreases the willingness
of participants to choose impatient choices (i.e., “To receive
$5 today”) (Magen et al., 2008). The explicit-zero format may
draw attention to the opportunity cost of each choice, there-
fore encouraging people to choose the alternative that incurs a
lower opportunity cost (i.e., to forgo the SS reward). Accord-
ingly, we speculate that the explicitness of opportunity cost
in each alternative can influence the choice of the decision
maker.
Most previous studies on intertemporal choice use money as
outcome (Read et al., 2005, 2012). However, opportunity costs are
not restricted to monetary or financial costs. Lost time, real cost
of output forgone, pleasure, or any other benefit that provides
utility should also be considered as opportunity cost (Zauber-
man and Lynch, 2005; Frederick et al., 2009; Lynch et al., 2010;
Spiller, 2011). Time is equally ubiquitous in the lives of peo-
ple and is involved in intertemporal choice as outcomes. For
instance, individuals choose between spending more time with
family now and in the future. A student may also choose between
spending 2 h on playing football with friends today and tomor-
row. Although Benjamin Franklin encouraged equating time
with money in his directive, “time is money,” research that com-
pares time and money shows that people react to them differ-
ently (Zauberman and Lynch, 2005; DeVoe and Pfeffer, 2007,
2010, 2011; Mogilner, 2010; Aaker et al., 2011). For example,
Zauberman and Lynch (2005) demonstrated that people expect
slack (the perceived surplus of a given resource available to com-
plete a focal task) for time to be greater in the future than in
the present. Typically, this expectation of slack growth in the
future is more pronounced for time than for money. Accord-
ing to the definition of opportunity cost, the opportunity cost of
time and money is different in intertemporal choice. For money
“Would you prefer [A] $5 today OR [B] $6.20 in 26 days?,” if
you choose “[A] $5 today,” your opportunity cost is “0 in 26
days.” For time “Would you prefer [A] get 1 tour day tomor-
row OR [B] get 2 tour days in a month?,” if you choose “[A] get
1 tour day tomorrow” your opportunity cost is “1 day studying
time/working time” (because you spend time on tour, you can-
not spend that time on studying or other things” and “0 day in a
month.”
The above analysis leads us to better comprehend that the
opportunity cost of time and money is different in intertemporal
choice. That is, gettingmoremoney is clearly a reward because we
lose nothing by gaining it. However, getting more free time is not
clearly a reward because we lose the chance of spending that time
on other activities. Therefore, when investigating the opportunity
cost of time rather than money in intertemporal choice, we need
to examine whether the time outcome is viewed as a gain/reward
or a loss/cost.
Given that people’s choices are heavily influenced by ways in
which the alternatives are framed, even if the different frames are
logically equivalent (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), we hypoth-
esize that representing each alternative in a different frame by
explicitly referring to the hidden opportunity cost of time in
each alternative will change the preference of participants. Specif-
ically, the same time outcome which is seen as a gain/reward in
one frame (hidden frame) can be seen as a loss/cost in another
frame (explicit frame), for example, an extracurricular activity
may be regarded as a gain if opportunity cost (e.g., the time spent
on the extracurricular activity can be used on studying) is not
explicated (hidden frame) but as a loss if opportunity cost is
explicated (explicit frame), therefore leading to a mirror-image
preference for “gain-seeking” vs. “loss-averse.” The subsequent
experiments demonstrate our attempt to prove or disprove our
hypothesis.
Experiment 1
Participants
A total of 106 undergraduate students majoring in psychology
from Shandong Normal University participated in this study in
a classroom setting (80 females, Mage = 20.31, SDage = 0.98).
All the participants provided oral consent and were given a small
gift for their participation. All experiments were approved by the
institutional review board of the Institute of Psychology, Chinese
Academy of Sciences.
Materials and Procedure
A pair of intertemporal choices was prepared in Chinese and
presented in questionnaire form in two versions.
The students were asked to imagine that they had recently
studied intensively and that the teacher would like to offer an
extracurricular activity to help them relax. They were given two
options and asked to choose the one they preferred.
Version A: hidden frame—does not point out the opportunity
cost of an extracurricular activity
A: participate in an extracurricular activity for 1 day tomorrow
B: participate in an extracurricular activity for 2 days in a week
Version B: explicit frame—points out the opportunity cost of
an extracurricular activity
A’: at the expense of 1 day of studying time, participate in an
extracurricular activity for 1 day tomorrow
B’: at the expense of 2 days of studying time, participate in an
extracurricular activity for 2 days in a week
Participants were randomly assigned to either Version A or
Version B. Version A had 56 participants, and Version B had 50
participants.
Results and Discussion
The results (Table 1) indicated that 4 of 56 participants preferred
the SS option (Option A) in Version A, and 28 of 50 participants
chose the SS option (Option A’) in Version B. A 2 (hidden frame
vs. explicit frame) × 2 (response) χ2 test revealed a significant
relationship between version and preference:χ2
(1,96)
= 29.91, p<
0.001, phi squared = 0.28. These results demonstrated that par-
ticipants were more likely to choose the LL option if the oppor-
tunity cost of time was hidden but were more likely to choose
the SS option if the opportunity cost of time was explicit. This
result revealed that the proportion of participants opting for the
SS option increased if the same problem was described in the
explicit frame and suggested that a hidden opportunity cost of
time effect was elicited.
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TABLE 1 | Preference results as a function of problem frame in
Experiment 1.
Problem frame Preference results
SS option LL option
Hidden frame (N = 56) 4 52
Explicit frame (N = 50) 28 22
Experiment 2
The preference shift in Experiment 1 violated descriptive invari-
ance, which is one of the principles of normative decision
making. Descriptive invariance claims that the different descrip-
tions of an event or object should not change the prefer-
ence of people. Tversky and Kahneman (1986) argued that the
normative principles of decision making are generally satis-
fied when their application is transparent but are sometimes
violated when not. The between-participants design used in
Experiment 1 was viewed as a condition in which the deci-
sion making would not be transparent. Therefore, the inten-
tion of Experiment 2 was to examine whether the hidden
opportunity cost of time effect was robust enough to survive
using a within-participant rather than a between-participant
design.
Participants
A total of 70 undergraduate students (33 females, Mage = 20.39,
SDage = 0.95) from the School of Economics in Shandong Nor-
mal University participated in Experiment 2 in a classroom set-
ting. All participants provided oral consent and were given a
small gift for their participation.
Materials and Procedure
The same pair of intertemporal choices used in Experiment 1
was also used in Experiment 2 with minor modification. Specifi-
cally, the participants would not choose from the two options but
would be asked to indicate their preference by circling a number
on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (definitely choose A/A’) to
7 (definitely choose B/B’).
Both versions of the choices were presented to each partici-
pant with other questions irrelevant to this study. The interval
between the two tests was at least 7 days. The order of presen-
tation of the two versions of choices was counter-balanced across
the participants. Based on the within-participant design in Exper-
iment 2, the application of decisionmaking should be regarded as
transparent.
Results
Participants were more likely to choose the LL option (Option
B/B’) (M = 4.14, SD = 1.18) if options were presented in the hid-
den version than in the explicit version (M = 3.18, SD = 1.15),
F(1, 69) = 20.59, p < 0.001, η
2
= 0.23. Therefore, Experiment
2 replicated the results of Experiment 1, although the decision
making was transparent.
Experiment 3
Based on the preference shift in Experiments 1 and 2, one might
argue that “extracurricular activities” are actually seen as a reward
and that the “hidden cost” is something in which, under the cir-
cumstances, students would have to be willing to risk offending
their teacher and appear to be a slacker. Therefore, the extra cost
of LL is NOT just an extra day of studying time—the real cost, as
the situation is described, is the teacher’s good opinion. Specifi-
cally, the teacher is offering one of two rewards, but in the explicit
framing, the teacher is pointing out to the student that by accept-
ing the LL offer, they will be slacking off and choosing to miss
more studying time (“Here’s your reward (LL)—but if you take it,
you’re a slacker”).
The aim of Experiment 3 is twofold: first, to help deter-
mine whether there is evidence to support the presumption that
“extracurricular activities” is a reward; second, to exclude the
potential confounding effect of the “hidden cost.” Accordingly,
we modified the scenario that was used in Experiments 1 and 2,
designed an athletic training scenario, and added a manipulation
check following participants’ response to each scenario.
Participants
A total of 94 undergraduate students (83 females, Mage = 20.14,
SDage = 1.39) from the School of Psychology in Shandong Nor-
mal University participated in Experiment 3 in a classroom set-
ting. All participants provided written consent and were given a
small gift for their participation.
Materials and Procedure
Two hypothetical scenarios were prepared in Chinese (for Chi-
nese versions see Appendix in Supplementary Material). One is
the studying time scenario that was used in Experiments 1 and
2. We modified this scenario by replacing the “teacher” with
“student representatives.” Specifically, the extracurricular activ-
ity would not be proposed by teacher but be proposed by stu-
dent representatives. To generalize the hidden opportunity cost
of time effect on intertemporal choice, we designed a parallel
training time scenario. In the training time scenario, the stu-
dents were asked to imagine that they were athletes and they
had recently trained intensively, and the teammates proposed
to offer a tour to help them relax. Participants were asked to
indicate their preference by circling a number on a seven-point
scale.
Each participant was randomly assigned to answer either a
hidden frame version or explicit frame version with each ver-
sion having two scenarios: 47 participants responded to a hid-
den frame version, and the other 47 participants responded to
an explicit frame version. Participants were asked to indicate
their choice by circling a number on the 7-point scale ranging
from 1 (definitely choose A) to 7 (definitely choose B). Then,
participants were asked to rate to what extent they considered
“1 day extracurricular activity, 2-day extracurricular activity, 1
day tour and 2-day tour” as loss or gain on a six-point scale (–3
for “large loss,” 3 for “large gain”). The two hypothetical scenar-
ios and the corresponding manipulation check were presented as
follows.
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Version A: Hidden Frame
Studying Time Scenario
The students were asked to imagine that they had recently stud-
ied intensively and that the student representatives propose to
offer an extracurricular activity to help them relax. Participants
were asked to indicate their preference by circling a number on a
seven-point scale.
Definitely
choose A1
Definitely
choose B1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
A1: participate in an extracurricular activity for 1 day tomorrow.
B1: participate in an extracurricular activity for 2 days in a week.
Do you consider “one/two-day extracurricular activity” as
loss or gain? Please indicate your judgment by circling a number
on a six-point scale.
Large
loss
middle
loss
a little
loss
a little
gain
middle
gain
large
gain
−3 −2 −1 1 2 3
Training Time Scenario
The students were asked to imagine that they were an athlete
and they had recently trained intensively, and the teammates
proposed to offer a tour to help them relax. Participants were
asked to indicate their preference by circling a number on a
seven-point scale.
Definitely
choose A2
Definitely
choose B2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
A2: participate in a tour for 1 day tomorrow.
B2: participate in a tour for 2 days in a week.
Do you consider “one/two-day tour activity” as loss or
gain? Please indicate your judgment by circling a number on a
six-point scale.
Large
loss
middle
loss
a little
loss
a little
gain
middle
gain
large
gain
–3 −2 −1 1 2 3
Version B: Explicit Frame
Studying Time Scenario
Definitely
choose A1’
Definitely
choose B1’
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
A1’: at the expense of 1 day of studying time, participate in an extracurricular activity for
1 day tomorrow.
B1’: at the expense of 2 days of studying time, participate in an extracurricular activity for
2 days in a week.
Do you consider “one/two-day extracurricular activity” as
loss or gain? Please indicate your judgment by circling a number
on a six-point scale.
Large
loss
middle
loss
a little
loss
a little
gain
middle
gain
large
gain
−3 −2 −1 1 2 3
Training Time Scenario
Definitely
choose A2’
Definitely
choose B2’
1 2 3 4 5 6 1
A2’: at the expense of 1 day of training time, participate in a tour for 1 day tomorrow.
B2’: at the expense of 2 days of training time, participate in a tour for 2 days in a week.
Do you consider “one/two-day tour activity” as loss or
gain? Please indicate your judgment by circling a number on a
six-point scale.
Large
loss
middle
loss
a little
loss
a little
gain
middle
gain
large
gain
−3 −2 −1 1 2 3
The experimental design was a 2 (hidden frame vs. explicit
frame) × 2 (studying time scenario vs. training time scenario,
nested within participants) between-subjects repeated factorial.
Results
Mean choice preference (1 for definitely choose SS and 7 for
definitely choose LL) as a function of frame (hidden frame vs.
explicit frame) and scenario (studying time vs. training time)
are shown in Figure 1. An ANOVA showed a main effect of the
opportunity cost frame on the rated preference, with LL choices
(2-day extracurricular activity/tour activity) being more likely to
be chosen in hidden frame condition, whereas SS choices (1 day
extracurricular activity/tour activity) were more likely to be cho-
sen in an explicit frame [F(1, 92) = 26.42, p < 0.001, η
2
= 0.13].
Participants’ preference for choice in the studying scenario was
not different from that in the training scenario [F(1, 92) = 0.58,
p = 0.44, η2 = 0.003]. Moreover, we found no significant sta-
tistical interaction [F(1, 92) = 1.56, p = 0.21, η
2
= 0.008],
suggesting that the “hidden opportunity cost of time effect” did
not differ between the two parallel scenarios.
Mean rating of gain/loss as a function of frame (hidden
frame vs. explicit frame) and studying/training time (1 day vs.
2 days) are shown in Figure 2. An ANOVA showed a main
effect of frame on mean rating of gain/loss, with scores of rating
(Mhiddenframe = 1.53) being higher in hidden frame condition
than those of rating (Mexplicitframe = 0.36) in explicit frame con-
dition [F(1, 92) = 51.17, p < 0.001, η
2
= 0.22]. The main effect
of studying/training time (1 day vs. 2 days) was not significant
[F(1, 92) = 0.43, p = 0.51, η
2
= 0.002]. Moreover, there was
significant two-way interaction [F(1, 92) = 30.16, p < 0.001,
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FIGURE 1 | Mean choice preference as a function of frame (explicit frame vs. hidden frame) and scenario (studying time vs. training time). Lower scores
indicate preference for SS option; higher scores indicate preference for LL option; a score of 4 indicates no preference.
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FIGURE 2 | Mean rating of gain/loss as a function of frame (explicit frame vs. hidden frame) and studying/training time (1 day vs. 2 days). Negative
scores indicate that “studying/training time” was seen as loss; positive scores indicate that “studying/training time” was seen as gain.
η
2
= 0.14]. Further simple effect analysis revealed that in the
hidden frame, the mean rating of 2 days of studying/training time
(Mtwo days = 1.78) was significantly higher than 1 day of study-
ing/training time (Mone day = 1.31) (F = 11.68, p = 0.001),
whereas in the explicit frame, the mean rating of 1 day of study-
ing/training time (Mone day = 0.48) was significantly higher than
2 days of studying/training time (Mtwo days = −0.12) (F = 18.92,
p < 0.001). Considering that the negative scores indicate that
“studying/training time” was seen as loss, the observed inter-
action suggests that the same time outcome in the LL option
is more likely to be seen as a gain in the hidden frame, but it
is more likely to be seen as a loss in the explicit frame. The
results of the manipulation check, together with the results of
choice preference, provide supportive evidence for our hypoth-
esis that the same time outcome which is seen as a gain/reward
in one frame (hidden frame) can be seen as a loss/cost in another
frame (explicit frame), indicating a mirror-image preference for
“gain-seeking” vs. “loss-averse.”
General Discussion
The present study investigated the opportunity cost of time rather
than money in intertemporal choice. The difference between the
time outcome andmonetary outcome of intertemporal choice lies
in that getting more money later is clearly a larger later reward,
but getting more time is not necessary a larger later reward. We
found that, unlike the monetary outcome, the same time out-
come which is seen as a gain/reward in hidden frame can be seen
as a loss/cost in explicit frame. The majority of our participants
rejected the LL option which was seen as a loss/cost if opportunity
cost of time was explicit. However, most participants preferred
the LL option which was seen as a gain/reward if opportunity
cost of time was hidden. We refer to this phenomenon as the
hidden opportunity cost of time effect on intertemporal choice.
This effect was detected regardless of whether its application was
transparent, and the effect was highly consistent across all the set-
tings tested in this paper. To our knowledge, the present research
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is the first to report this new phenomenon in intertemporal
choice.
This research used time as the outcome and demonstrated
that changing the construal of outcomes could affect the abil-
ity of individuals to consider the future consequences of their
decisions. Although the presentation of the hidden and explicit
opportunity costs of the time formats was logically equivalent,
the different methods of presenting the options resulted in differ-
ent results. The explicit opportunity cost of time formats resulted
in high rates of SS choice and low rates of LL choice. This
finding, together with other framing evidence reported previ-
ously in the literature (e.g., Levin, 1987; Levin and Gaeth, 1988;
Lichtenstein et al., 1991; Li, 1998; Li and Xie, 2006; Li et al.,
2007), contradict the principle of descriptive invariance (Tver-
sky et al., 1988), which holds that individuals’ decisions and
preferences should not change solely because their options are
described differently. The possible reason for this result is that
the explicit opportunity cost format may draw attention to the
opportunity cost of each choice; the “time” outcome is viewed
as gain/reward in the hidden frame but loss/cost in the explicit
frame, therefore encouraging people to choose the alternative
that incurs a lower opportunity cost (i.e., the opportunity cost
(loss) of 1 day of studying/training time was smaller than that
of 2 days of studying/training time in explicit frame as shown
in Figure 2). According to Magen et al. (2008), mentioning the
“obvious” opportunity cost of alternatives may help decision
makers choose in a more informed manner. They implied that
opportunity cost changes the key decision input from the abso-
lute value to the value of the option relative to the opportu-
nity cost obtained. Additional research is required to elucidate
the underlying mechanism of the effect observed in this study
and to test this effect in real-world settings (e.g., time manage-
ment). Moreover, given that opportunity cost is considered to be
the evaluation placed on the most highly valued of the rejected
alternatives or opportunities (Eatwell et al., 1998; Buchanan,
2008), further research is needed to investigate the plausibil-
ity and possible boundary conditions (e.g., long-term impor-
tance or weights placed on opportunity cost in each alternative)
for the relationship between opportunity cost and SS/LL choice
proposed here.
The actions of the grasshopper in Aesop’s fable serve as an
example of impulsiveness and short-sighted decision making
(Milkman et al., 2008). People generally exhibit short-sighted
preferences by choosing inferior, immediate rewards over
ultimately superior but delayed future rewards (e.g., drug abuse,
usurious loan, and extracurricular activities instead of studying).
This short-sighted decision-making is implicated in many types
of problematic behavior in healthy, normal, developing, and
clinical populations, therefore leading to substantial individual
and societal costs. Resisting impulsiveness and short-sighted ten-
dencies to increase goal directedness often requires the exertion
of control (e.g., Baumeister, 2002; Houben and Jansen, 2011;
Tsukayama et al., 2012). The reported hidden opportunity cost
of time effect, which is produced by simply changing wording,
can help individuals conduct optimal long-term choices without
the need for increased control.
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